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PERMANENT INJURIES FROm TORTS TO REALTY OTHER THAN
TRESPASSE.-Here, also, there is a modification of the rule. For
such permanent injuries but one action is maintainable, and in it
all damages, present and prospective, may be recovered.
To this class belong all those injuries to realty which flow from
the erection of permanent structures adjacent to the plaintiff's
realty, e. g., railways, dams, dykes and roads, which produce a per-
manent change in the condition of the property. We have seen
that the application of the rule providing for successive actions was
partly dependent on the temporariness of the condition causing the
injury, and that exemplary damages are provided for as a stimulant
to the defendant to hasten the removal of the wrongful condition.
INJURIES PERMANENT IN FAOT.-BUt suppose that the conditiou
created by the defendant is a permanent one-one which in nature
and design is permanent and must permanently affect the value of
neighboring property. Here it is no longer a question whether
future damages may be averted or not. Here punitive damages
will not stimulate the defendant to a change of the conditions.
Here the application of the rule for successive actions, with recove-
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ries limited to past damages, would produce what it is the policy
of the law to prevent, viz., a multiplicity of suits; and the never-
ending chancery suit of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, would be outdone
by the litigation incident to the erection of any permanent structure.
An additional reason for not applying the rule of successive
actions in this class of cases is that in the greater portion of inju-
ries of this class the injury is caused by a public work which is in
itself lawful, and as to which all rules based on the temporary char-
acter and probable aversion of future damage under the stimulant
of punitive damages can have no application. In these cases the
permanent and lawful character of the work is established, and
where a remedy for injuries of this kind is allowed, it ought not to
be governed by rules which are developed from injuries caused by
works of an unlawful or tortious character.
The rule of damages should be determined in view of the character
of the work. The leading case in this class is Troy v. Cheshire Bd.,
12 N. H. 83. This was an action by the town of Troy against the
railway company for damages caused by building a railroad bridge.
The plaintiff recovered and was allowed to include in its damages
the prospective increased cost of maintaining the highway. In de-
livering the opinion of the court, BELL, J., said: "Wherever the
nuisance is of such a character that its continuance is necessarily
an injury, and where it is of a permanent character that will con-
tinue without change from any cause but human labor, there the
damage is an original damage and may be at once fully compen-
sated, since the injured person has no means to compel the individual
doing the wrong to apply the labor necessary to remove the cause
of injury, and can only cause it to be done, if at all, by the expendi-
ture of his own means. • But where the continuance of such act is
not necessarily injurious, and where it is necessarily of a permanent
character, but may or may not be injurious, or may or may not be
continued, there the injury to be compensated in a suit is only the.
damage that has happened. Thus, the individual who so manages
the water he uses for his mills as to wash away the soil of his
neighbor, is liable at once for all the injury occasioned by its
removal, because it is in its nature a permanent injury; but if his
works are so constructed that upon the recurrence of a similar
freshet, the water will probably wash away more of the land, for
this there can be no recovery until the damage has actually arisen,
because it is yet contingent whether any such damage will ever
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arise. A person erects a dam upon his own land, which throws
back the water upon his neighbor's land; he will be answerable for
all damage which he has caused before the date of the writ, and
ordinarily for no more, because it is as yet contingent and uncer-
tain whether any further damage will be occasioned or not, because
such a dam is not, of its own nature and necessarily, injurious to
the lands above, since that depends more upon the man ner in which
the dam is used than upon its form. But if such a dam is, in its
nature, of a permanent character, and from its nature must continue
permanently to affect the value of the land flowed, then the entire
injury is at once occasioned by the wrongful act, and may be at
once recovered in damages. In one of the cases which arose from
the building of the great canals of New York, the case was that
a high dam was erected upon the falls of the Hudson for the pur-
pose of diverting the waters of the river into a feeder for the canal;
the lands of an owner were buried twenty feet under water, and
their value to him, of course, entirely destroyed; the work was, in
its nature and design, permanent. There it would be clear that
the party injured would be entitled to recover the entire damages
he had sustained, and must sustain in a single action; in truth,
substantially, the entire value of his property." I have cited this
case at length for its elaborate statement of the rule.
For other cases sustaining the same rule, see Beckett v. Midland
Rd., 3 L. 11., 0. P. 82; Woods v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 5 N. H. 467 ;
ffeard v. Middlesex Canal Co., 5 Metc. 81; Warner v. Bacon, 8
Gray 397; Fowle v. New Raven & Northampton Co., 107 Mass.
352; s. a. 112 Id. 334; Powers v. Council Bluffs, 45 Ia. 654;
Stodghill v. 0. B. & Q. Rd., 53 Id. 341; Chicago & Alton Rd. v.
ifaher, 91 Ill. 312; Fan Schoick v. Delaware, &c., Canal Co.,
20 N. J. L. 249; Seely v. Alden, 61 Penn. St. 302; Van Orsdol
v. B. C. Rd. & N. -d., 56 Ia. 470; Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me.
482; Adams v. Hastings, 18 Minn. 265; Cadle v. Muscatine W.
Rd., 44 Ia. 11; .Finley v. Hershey, 41 Id. 389; ll. Central Rd.
v. Grabill, 50 Ill. 241; 0ooper v. Randall, 59 Id. 317; -Elizabeth-
town, ft., Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush 382 ; Jeffersonville, &c., Rd. v.
.Esterle, 13 Id. 667; Ortwine v. Baltimore, 16 Md. 887; Chase v.
New York Central Rd., 24 Barb. 273; -Easterbrook v. -Erie Rd.,
51 Id. 94; City of _North Vernon v. Voegler (Ind.), 2 N. E. Rep.
821 ; Fifth Nat. Bank v. New York -Elevated Rd., 28 Fed. Rep.
231 ; Bizer v. Ottumwa Co. (Ia.), 30 N. W. Rep. 172.
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In Fowle v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 107 Mass. 852;
s. c. 112 Id. 334, where the injury was a washing away of the
defendant's land caused by building a railroad embankment, GRAY,
J., said, "The embankment of the defendants was a permanent
structure which, without any further act except keeping it in repair
must continue to turn the current of the river in such a manner as
gradually to wash away the plaintiff's land. For this injury the
plaintiff might recover in one action entire damages, not limited to
those which had been actually suffered at the date of the writ. And
the judgment in one such action is a bar to another like action
between the parties for subsequent injuries from the same cause."
In the second hearing, COLT, J., said: "The case at bar is not
to be treated strictly in this respect as an action for an abatable
nuisance; more accurately, it is an action against the defendant for
the construction of a public work under its charter, in such a man-
ner as to cause unnecessary damage by want of -reasonable care and
skill in its construction. For such an injury the remedy is at
common law. And if it results from a cause which is either per-
manent in its character or is treated as permanent by the parties, it
is proper that entire damages should be assessed with reference to
past and probable future injury."
A similar class of cases which come within the same rule is that
of torts to realty for which the measure of damages is the diminu-
tion in value .of the property injured. This rule was adopted in
Chase v. New York Central Rd., 24 Barb. 273; Easterbrook v.
.Erie .Ry. Co., 51 Id. 94; Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron
Co., 84 Penn. St. 279; Seely v. Alden, 61 Id. 302; iinnequa
Spring Co. v. Coon (Penn.), 12 Rep. 763; C., B. 1. &--P. Rd. v.
Carey, 90 Ill. 514; Harsh v. Trullinger, 6 Oregon 356; And see
Anon., 4 Dall. 147 ; l. Central Rd. v. Grabill, 50 Ill. 241, 246 ;
Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Graham, 28 Id. 73; Decatur
Gas Liqht Co. v. Howell, 92 Id. 19.
But a permanent injury will not be presumed : Cooper v. Ran-
dall, 59 Ill. 317. In the cases of works of public utility of a large
and costly character, as, for instance, the high dam to feed the
canal, cited in Troy v. Cheshire Rd., the court will take judicial
notice of the character of the work ; but, in general, the plaintiff
has the burden of making out a proper case for such damages by
allegations and proofs showing the permanent nature of the injury.
In Battishill v. Reed, 18 C. B. 696, cited supra, CRESSWELL, J.,
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said: "The plaintiff had no right to assume that things would
remain as they were." In Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Penn. St. 71,
where the damage complained of was caused by the defendant's
inserting a pipe in the stream on his own land, the court said:
"The act he committed was not of such a character as to assume
it to continue through all coming time, and to justify the assess-
ment of damages accordingly." And again: "A severance of
the pipe would cause the water to run in the accustomed channel,
and remove the whole cause of complaint." To same effect see
Duryea v. .Mayor, 26 Hun 120; Whitmore v. Bischoff, 5 Id.
176; Adams v. Rd., 18 Minn. 260.
So where a railway company constructs an inadequate culvert in
its track, which, in occasional seasons of freshet, causes injury to
the adjacent lands, the law will not presume that such inadequate
provision will be permanently maintained, and the recovery will
not extend to a diminution of value on that basis, and successive
actions may be maintained as often as the injuries recur: Union
Trust Co. v. CUppy, 26 Kan. 562; -Elliot v. Fitchburg Rd., 10
Gush. 191; Miller v. .Keokuk (Iowa), 14 Am. & Eng. Rd. Gas.
293; Benson v. Chicago & Alton Rd., 78 Mo. 504; Abbott v.
Kansas City, &c., Bd., 20 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 103; Louisville
& Nashville Rd. v. Rays, 11 Tenn. 284; Little Rock & Fort
Smith Rd. v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463; Quinn v. C., B. . Q. Rd.
(Iowa), 17 Am. & Eng. Rd. Gas. 51 ; Drake v.C., R. -1. ' P. Rd.,
Ibid. 45.
In Quinn v. C., B. & Q. Bd., above cited, where the railroad
company had made an excavation and wrongfully permitted water
to accumulate therein, the court expressly said: " The plaintiff's
right of recovery for diminution in the value of the use of the pre-
mises, should have been limited to the time during which it was
proven that the nuisance existed." For a similar case on changing
the grade of a railway track in the street, see Little 1Mfiami Bd. v.
Heambleton(Ohio), 141 Am. & Eng. Rd. Gas. 126. There the abutting
owner has a property interest in the street. The court said: "The
injury, as shown by the proof, is of two kinds : that resulting from
overflow of water on the premises of the plaintiff and damage con-
sequent upon it, and other injuries of a temporary kind, and injury
in its nature permanent, resulting mainly from a. change of grade
of the railroad, whereby the relative level of the property of the
plaintiff and the railroad is broken up and destroyed, and perma-
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nent changes in the buildings and improvements of the plaintiff are
made necessary, and in consequence of all which his property has
been permanently injured. * * * The charge of the court on the
trial below was correct so far as the causes of damages were affected
by limitation, that is, that, for permanent injury, the limitation
would be twenty-one years, the whole period during which the acts
of the defendants in continuing the cause of such injury was with-
out legal right. And that, for temporary injury, the plaintiff
would be limited to four years before his action for the same."
Here the court treat the statute as to permanent injury as running
from the time the injury was first committed; and as to temporary
injuries they treat the cause of action as. continuing, the statute of
limitations advancing pari passu and limiting the damages to those
accrued four years previous to action brought.
Uline v. N. . Central Rd. (N. Y.), 23 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 3, is
a very important case, similar to the last. The majority of the court
hold that the recovery is limited to damages prior to action brought.
DAN ORTH, J., in a vigorous dissenting opinion, holds that the injury
is permanent, and that the recovery must be once for all. The issue
was clearly defined. EARL, J., in delivering the opinion of the
majority, said: " The question, however, still remains, what dam-
ages ? All her damages upon the assumption that the nuisance
was to be permanent, or only such damages as she sustained up to
the commencement of the action ? We have here for consideration
an important principle of law which has to be frequently applied,
and which ought to be well known and thoroughly settled. There
never has been in this state before this case the least doubt expressed
in any judicial decision, so far as I can discover, that the plaintiff
in such a case is entitled to recover damages only up to the com-
mencement of the action. That such is the rule is as well* settled
here as any rule of law can be by repeated and uniform decisions
of all the courts; and it is the prevailing doctrine elsewhere."
Then follows a long list of citations of cases belonging mainly to
all four of the preceding classes of torts rather than to the class in
hand, and a few citations belonging to this class, but which are dis-
tinguishable and are distinguished therefrom in the dissenting opinion
-all of which shows that the learned judge relied more upon dog-
matic assertion and vigorous citation than upon a patient analysis
of the facts in issue in the case at bar and in the several cases
cited. The New York cases cited by him are distinguished by
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DANFORTH, J., as we shall see. The Wisconsin cases I notice
further on. The remainder of the citations made by EARL, J., will
nearly all be found distributed among the first four preceding
classes.
The facts in the case are thus stated by DANFORTH, J. "The
plaintiff alleged and proved that she owned and occupied in person
and by tenants certain improved lots 'of land lying on the northerly
side of Colonie street, and extending to its centre; that between the.
houses on those lots and the travelled roadway was a sidewalk; and
by her complaint alleged that the defendant entered upon the pro-
perty (i. e. in the street), and tore up the pavement in Colonic
street in front of the houses, raised the street higher than it was
before, and also the street west of said premises and between said
houses and the west side of Broadway, and tore up and raised the
sidewalks in front of her houses, and raised and filled up the gutter
in front of them, and so shaped the street and gutters as to pour
the water therefrom down over said sidewalk and into the basements
of said houses, by reason of which the premises are made liable to
be flooded with water, and have been at different times flooded with
mud, filth and water, and the property thereby injured, and the
said premises rendered damp and unhealthy, and by which the
rental value of said houses was greatly depreciated; and also that
the shape given to the surface of said .street by the defendant is
such as to make the approach to said houses inconvenient and
unsafe, and to interfere with the use of the same and depreciate its
value ; and that said street is made so steep in its decline on the
north side that wagons cannot safely or conveniently stand in front
of said premises of said plaintiff, and asked for damages sustained
by reason of these facts. * * * The court held that there was
nothing in the case to show that the alteration in the street and
construction of tracks was for a temporary purpose, or a mere tres-
pass, but on the contrary appeared to be of a permanent kind and
character and held the complaint sufficient."
EARL, J., had distinguished several New York cases, viz., Hen-
derson v. Rd., 78 N. Y. 433; Schell v. Plumb, 55 Id. 592;
Williams v. Bd., Story v. Bd., as being eases in equity, of which
DANFORTH, says : "The defence (remoteness of damages) did not
prevail, and unless a distinction favorable to the defendant can be
drawn from the fact that this is an action at law and that a suit in
equity, it is decisive here. In that case full compensation was
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awarded upon conditions which when complied with, protected the
defendants in the enjoyment of the property trespassed upon. * * *
The appellant cites various cases in support of a contrary view, but
I think them inapplicable so far as those from the courts of this
state are concerned; they relate to acts which obviously were or
might be of a temporary and not permanent character. The Mahon
Case, 24 N. Y. 658, was of the former class. It was considered in
the Henderson Case, and thought to be no obstacle in the way of
allowing complete and final damages where the act causing the
injury was necessarily permanent. In other states the courts differ."
The New York cases, thus distinguished, include -Duryea v. Mayor,
26 Hun 120, and Plate v. N. Y. C. Rd., 37 Id. 473. EARL, J.,
cited Harrington v. Bd., 17 Minn. 215, and Adams v. Bd., 18
Id. 260. But the Minnesota rule is established by Baldwin v. C,
M 4 St. P. Bd., 29 N. W. R. 5, distinguishing Brakken v. llinne.
apolis &. St. 1L. Rd., 29 Minn. 41; s. c. 81 Id. 45, and 32 Id. 425 ;
in the following terms: "As the company had a right to and might
at any time remedy the wrong, the court held it improper to assess
the damages on the assumption that it would be permanent, and
that they ought to be measured as they might accrue from time to
time, until the company should remedy the wrong. In this case
the wrong was at once fully complete and the injury permanent.
The locus in quo not being in the possession of defendant, and it
not having the right to re-enter on the street to fill the excavation,
damages are not to be measured by the condition in which when
completed it left the property. The case comes within the decision
in Karst v. St. Paul, &c., Rd., 22 Minn. 118, in which the proper
measure of damages upon a wrong precisely like that in this case,
was held to be the diminution in the value (not of the rental but
of the property)."
In Fifth Nat. Bank v. N. Y. Elevated Rd., 28 Fed. Rep. 231,
damages subsequent to the date of action caused by a permanent
injury by obstruction of light were recovered and the judgment
sustained, but the court refrained from expressly ruling upon the
point, citing with other cases, Everson v. Powers, 89 N. Y.
528.
In Chicago & -. . Bd. v. Loeb (1ll)., 8 N. E. R. 460, the court
were confronted with the exact question where there should be suc-
cessive actions or one action for the injuries caused by the throwing
of smoke, cinders and ashes upon plaintiff's premises by defendant.
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They said; SHELDON, 0. J., "It has frequently been held by this
court that in an action brought for deterioration in the value of
real estate from a nuisance of a permanent character, all damages
for past and future injury to the property may be recovered; and
that one recovery in such action will be a bar to all future actions
for the same cause. Ottawa Gas Co. v. Graham, 28 Ill. 73; ill.
Central Rd. v. Grabill, 50 Id. 242; Cooper v. Randall, 59 Id. 321;
-Decatur Gas Co. v. Howell, 92 Id. 19; Chicago & Alton Rd. v.
Mfaher, 91 Id. 312. * * * If the above doctrine as to entireness
of recovery in one action where the cause of injury is of a perma-
nent kind is to be admitted, it should apply peculiarly in this char-
acter of case. The cause of damage here is not a nuisance proper.
* * * The action for damage may be regarded as in the nature of
one kind of condemnation proceeding." The court cite for the
same view, Heard v. Middlesex Canal Co., 5 Mete. 81; Chicago &
. Rd. v. Baker, 73 Ill. 316 ; and Micago & P. Rd. v. Stein, 75
Id. 41, all cases of eminent domain; but several of the cases first
cited by the court are of private nuisance.
In Wisconsin it is held in Ford v. Rd., 14 Wis. 609 ; and Blesech
v. Rd., 43 Id. 183, that the action for depreciation of property for
such causes must be by statutory petition within the eminent domain
law. Other cases, Carl v. Rd., 46 Wis. 625; Buckner v. C:., At.
& St. P. Rd., 56 Id. 403; s. c. 60 Id. 264, hold that such damages
are recoverable only so far as accrued at date of action. This dif-
ference is probably due to the state of the eminent domain law in
Wisconsin. There the constitution provides for compensation for a
taking only, and not for damages to lands not taken. The courts
have worked out the result that when part of a tract is taken dam-
ages to the remainder are recoverable once for all, but where no
part is taken the character of the work will not be considered and
such damages if recoverable at all are recoverable only as accrued.
See Washburn v. Milwaukee & L. W. Rd., 59 Wis. 364.
When a defendant, who has created such a permanent injury, has
been subjected to payment of the permanent damages does he
thereby acquire the right to maintain the cause of the injury ?
In Jeffersonville, &c., Rd. v. Esterle, 13 Bush 667 or 678, the
court answers: "The appellee, by his action, in effect consents
that the appellants may continue for all future time to use the street
as they are now using it, and in consideration therefor, to accept
such judgment as may be herein rendered." But this ruling is in
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view of the character of the railroad as a public work, lawfully in
the street.
DANFORTH, J., in the Uline Case, cited supra, decides the same
question the same way under the same limitation. He says: "The
statutes referred to, allowing the assessment of compensation where
the railroad company has, without right, placed its tracks upon the
land of another, in terms apply to any such case, and go' upon the
assumption that the appropriation of the use of the land and
the structure placed upon it, are permanent, and such is its nature.
It is for the purposes of its incorporation public policy requires
that it should remain; and although, in the first instance, without
right, yet, after compensation has been determined and paid, the
company become possessed of such land during the continuance of
the corporation : L. 1847, c. 272, sect. 3."
These decisions answer the question as applied to public works.
As applied to private nuisances the rational answer must be found
in the meaning of the term "permanent." If a condition created
by the defendant is permanent, it cannot be terminated. His tort
is self-continuing and beyond his power to discontinue. And after
he has paid for his mischief it is settled, both upon reason and
authority, that he is entitled to the beneficial use of the condition
so established. See the list of cases at the beginning of this divi-
sion.
INJURIES PERMANENT IN INTENTION, BUT REMOVABLE IN
FACT.-But there is a large class of injuries which are' caused by
conditions which, if left to themselves, would be permanent, but
which are possibly capable of termination. What is the rule here ?
Rationally, the complainant would be left to his remedy by succes-
sive actions, vindictive damages, as hereinbefore stated, and by
injunctions. (Gould, Waters, sects. 512-520; High, Injunetions,
sect. 740 et seg.) And so, as was remarked by EARL, J., arguendo,
" a railroad company may be restrained by injunction or expelled
by ejectment from taking and using property in such a way," citing
Brown v. Galley, Hill & D. 308; -Etz v. Daily, 20 Barb. 32;
Redfield v. Utica, &e., Bd., 25 Id. 54. But suppose that the
plaintiff avers that such injury is permanent, and the defendant
does not take issue thereon, or taking issue is defeated by the
proof. The plaintiff recovers damages upon that basis. He cannot
afterwards recover exemplary damages or maintain an injunction
bill. If, therefore, the defendant wishes to acquire the right to
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maintain the structure or work in perpetuity, as against the plain-
tiff and those claiming under him he can do it by suffering a
recovery of damages for a permanent injury.
In Central Branch N. P. Rd. v. Andrews, 26 Kan. 702, 710,
711, it is said: "The plaintiff has chosen to consider the obstruc-
tion of the alley as a permanent injury to his lots, as a quasi con-
demnation and permanent taking and appropriation of a certain
interest in his property; and he can therefore recover merely for
the consequent depreciation in value of his property by reason of
such permanent injury, by reason of such permanent taking and
appropriation, by reason of such quasi condemnation. He had the
privilege to consider the obstruction of the alley as only a tempo-
rary injury, and to have sued for any special or temporary damage
which might have occurred at any time by reason of the obstruction.
But it seems he did not choose to so consider the obstruction ; he
chose to consider it as permanent, and as he has chosen to consider
it as permanent, and amounting to a permanent taking and appro-
priation of an interest in his property, he must be governed by the
rules generally governing condemnation proceedings. * * * * It
seems to us that he then consents that this railroad company shall
permanently appropriate his property in the alley, for he then
brings his action because of such appropriation."
ADDITIONAL REMEDY BY INJUNCTION.-But again suppose that
a proposed work will be permanent if suffered to remain, but the
plaintiff does not desire to part with his property or" suffer a dimi-
nution of the beneficial use thereof by reason of such work. In
that case his remedy is by injunction.' The injunction will lie in
the first instance where the permanency of the injury is evident,
but in cases of doubt, whether the injury is more than a temporary
deprivation, which can be compensated at law, the questions of the
plaintiff's right and of the defendant's disposition to resist the per-
suasive influence of a verdict for compensatory damages at law,
here, of course, the damages would be up to the date of action
brought, for the suit proceeds upon the theory accepted by all
parties and premised in the nature of the case that the injury is
removable in fact. Here, where the defendant asserts the right or
1 I have touched on the remedy by injunction incidentally only, as not strictly a
part of the law on the recovery of prospective damages, but in order to point out
that the rule does not comeiel a property owner to part with his property by a forced
sale.
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intention to maintain the structure, he would be estopped to deny
its permanency under the doctrine of (Jentral Branch P. Rd. v.
Andrews, supra. The summary of the rule on permanent injury
would therefore be-
(a) Injuries permanent and beyond the power of either party to
terminate.
(b) Injuries continuous and permanent in intention, but capable
of removal.
Plaintiffs may, where the injuries are by a public work, elect to
treat them as permanent, and have the same remedies as in class (a);
or where the work has not been lawfully erected, elect to treat
them as temporary and compel a removal.
In proceedings upon an injunction bill the court would not be
limited by the pecuniary amount of damages caused, but would hold
an injury irreparable, which would materially lessen the enjoyment
of property by its owner. A man is not compelled to take a ver-
dict for damages in perpetuity, even where the amount is definitely
ascertainable. Thus, in White v. Forbes, Walker's Ch. (Mich.)
112 or 114, on a bill to enjoin flowage by a mill-dam, which the
defendant claimed the right to continue, MANNiNG, Chancellor,
said : " The extent of the injury, provided there be a substantial
injury done, is of no very great importance. Every man has a
right to the enjoyment of his property undisturbed by another, and
to be protected in that enjoyment; and, what one may consider of
little value, another may esteem very highly. The court will not,
in cases of this kind, be governed by dollars and cents alone, but
will inquire whether the injury is of such a nature that it can rea-
sonably be supposed to lessen materially the enjoyment of property
by its owner."
So in Attorney- aeneral v. Sheffleld aas Consumers' Co., 3 DeG.,
M. & G. 304, CRANWORTE, L. J., said: "The court will not let a
person set up a nuisance and say that it shall"remain because it is
very little. If it is a nuisance, and is likely to continue, the Lord
Chancellor said, that shall not be allowed ;" and KNIGHT BRUCE,
L. J., said : "It has been argued that the annoyance (if any) felt,
and, possible, to be feared, must be small, slight and unfit for this
court's interference. But the frequent recurrence forever, or during
a period probably long and unascertainable, of an annoyance, slight
in itself (slight, I mean, if occurring but upon a single occasion, or
recurring only at very rare intervals), may much interfere with the
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reasonable convenience and comfort of life." And this proposition
is supported in the notes to that case by the late J. 0. Perkins,
with great wealth of citations. So, in Goldsmid v. Tunbridge
Wells, L. R., 1 Ch. 349, TURNER, L. J., said: " The interference
of the court in cases of prospective injury very much depends, as
I apprehend, upon the nature and extent of the apprehended mis-
chief, and upon the certainty or uncertainty of its arising or con-
tinuing ; and the fact of the nuisance having commenced raises a
presumption of its continuance. * * * I think that it ought not to
do so in cases in which the injury is merely temporary and trifling;
but I think that it ought to do so in cases in which the injury is perma-
nent and serious." Though, in these English cases, the injunction
was not allowed it was on the ground that the permanent injury
was not in fact made out, and the principle is sustained. And the
law is so laid down with copious references in 2 Dan. Oh. *1637-8.
But this principle gives way in case of public works. The policy
of the law favors such works, and, except in cases of wrongful entry
or unnecessary damage, the law will leave the injured party to his
remedy in damages. The remarks in the Uline Case, the Loeb
Case and the Kentucky ase cited above, assimilating this remedy
to a form of condemnation are conclusive upon this.
CosT oF REMoVAL.-The confusion among the decisions on this
subject called forth from Mr. Mayne the following : "In fact, the
whole law upon the subject of damages in the case of continuing
nuisances or trespasses seems in a very unsatisfactory state." He
then proceeded to recommend a new rule for computing damages
for continuing trespasses. He says: "The fair rule in such a case
would be to give the plaintiff such damages as would compensate
him for the loss sustained up to the time of the verdict, and would
pay him for putting the land into its original state. If he chose to
leave the trespass after this it would clearly be because he thought
it advantageous to himself; and if so, he ought not to be allowed
to sue again." IHe cites a case where this rule was applied in an
action on a covenant to repair: S ortridge v. Lamplugh, 2 Ld.
Raym. 798-803.
The case is plainly not in point in'an action for a tort; and is
useful more as suggesting a rule than as a precedent for a rule.
The reporter of Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Ad. & E. 503, suggested the
same rule in a note to that case, as follows: " Qucere, whether the
plaintiff, in the principal case, might not have recovered damages
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in respect of the expense of removing the buttresses herself, and
the effect of such recovery." This was considered by BREWER, J.,
in a case where it was directly in point in Kansas Pacific Bd. v.
Milman, 17 Kan. 232. He said: "It seems to us very doubtful
whether this ruling can be sustained upon principle. As suggested
by the reporter, suppose the plaintiff had recovered, as a part of the
damages in the first action, as he properly might, the expense of
removing these buttresses, and this fact had appeared in the second
suit, could the action have been maintained ? And what difference,
we ask, does it make whether he did actually recover for such ex-
pense ? It was a proper matter of damages ; it was a part of the
amount necessary to place the land as it was before the trespass ; he
was entitled to recover it if he proved it; and if he failed to prove
it, or if, after proving it, the court refused to allow it, neither the
failure nor the error laid the foundation for a second action." It
will be seen that he here takes the rule for granted as a proper one.
But suppose that a tract of swamp land of trifling value has had an
embankment wrongfully erected thereon. The cost of removal
would be many times the entire- value of the property and many
times the amount of loss to the plaintiff by the obstruction and de-
privation of the use of his property. Is the cost of removal a fair
measure of damages in such case ? It seems not. And for reasons
similar to these it was rejected in -Easterbrook v. Erie Rd., 51
Barb. 94; Deosta v. Massachusetts Mining Co., 17 Cal. 613.
The same questions were in the mind of WALKER, J., in delivering
the opinion in C., _B. I. & P. Rd. v. Carey, 90 111. 514. He said:
"Where there is a permanent injury that cannot be remedied, of
course the measure is the depreciation in value of the property
injured. In such case, the injury being continuous, and may be
perpetual, is incapable of removal and cannot be obviated, and there
can be no other rule adopted so fair and just as the depreciation in
the value of the property; but where the cause of the injury may
be removed at a reasonable expense by the party injured, that fact
should be considered. If, however, the obstruction is on the right
of way of appellant, appellees have no right to enter thereon to
remove it, as the law will nor require them to commit a trespass to
remove the obstruction, even if it would, as contended, cost but a
trifle, nor can appellant require them to enter its right of way to
remove obstructions. "Again, if appellant has constructed these
obstructions and will maintain them, it must pay all damages pro-
